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This chapter investigates Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum in relation to 
contemporary photography. Deleuze’s account is analysed in conjunction with a close 
reading of Plato’s Sophist (the simulacrum’s philosophical origin). Theorisations of 
photography by writers such as Rosalind Krauss are also considered. The second section 
of the chapter explores the simulacrum in relation to Sarah Pickering’s Public Order 
series (2002–2005). Public Order is seen to possess a complex relation to similitude and 
to raise questions about the nature of photography as a documentary medium. The 
chapter concludes by reflecting on distinctions between repetition and 
representation.</ABSTRACT> 
</OPENER> 
<BODY>Conventionally understood as a copy (or a facsimile of a copy), simulacrum is 
a Latin term denoting an image, likeness or semblance. This definition of the concept has 
obvious application to a medium that was characterised by its capacity to generate 
“nearly fac-simile copies” including “a multitude of minute details which add the truth 
and reality of the representation” (Talbot 1844). Yet the philosophical complexity of the 
simulacrum is belied by readings that disregard the particular nature of its representation. 
The philosopher Daniel W. Smith asserts that simulacrum derives from “the Latin 
simulare (to copy, represent, feign)” (Smith 1997: x). The simulacrum pertains to a 
specific type of copy—the false copy that produces a semblance of reality. This chapter 
will consider the concept of the simulacrum with particular reference to the philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze. In Deleuze, the simulacrum embraces the complexity of distinct forms 
of Platonic mimesis. Deleuze proposes that the philosophical origin of the concept occurs 
in Plato’s Sophist where the simulacrum is posited as a “phantasma” in distinction to a 
true likeness. 
Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) was one of the most important French philosophers of the 
twentieth century. Deleuze was part of a generation of thinkers (alongside his contemporaries 
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Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) who came to prominence in the late 1960s and whose 
work has been labelled as post-structuralist.1 Whereas Deleuze’s early writing often focuses 
on the history of philosophy, his later work (including his collaborations with Felix Guattari) 
demonstrates increasing engagement with politics, psychoanalysis, science and literature. 
Deleuze’s influence on the arts has been considerable. His writing has engendered new 
thought on the philosophy of film (Cinema 1, 2005 [1983] and Cinema 2, 2005 [1985]) and 
on painting (Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 2003 [1981]). Deleuze’s contribution to 
photography, however, is less clear. This chapter will consider Deleuze’s concept of the 
simulacrum and its pertinence to contemporary photography. In the first section, I will focus 
on Deleuze’s account of the simulacrum derived from his close reading of the concept’s 
Platonic origin. Plato’s dialogue will be analysed in light of Deleuze’s reading. I take the 
simulacrum to be that which purports to be a true copy of the model it appears to resemble, 
but which is actually a false likeness. The distinction between truth and simulation is central. I 
will propose that the concept of the simulacrum has particular resonance with photography’s 
capacity to produce a copy of the real. Moreover, it is when photography engages with the 
simulacral (transcending its status as a truthful, technologically generated medium) that we 
observe its true potential. The second section of this chapter will comprise an analysis of 
Sarah Pickering’s Public Order series (2002–2005), which explicitly challenges the 
conception of photography as a purveyor of truth. I will begin, however, by briefly 
considering theorisations of the simulacrum and its relation to photography. 
<HEAD1><TITLE>Photography and the simulacrum</TITLE></HEAD1> 
The photograph’s relation to the simulacrum is twofold. On the one hand, the concept of 
the simulacrum may be seen as antithetical to photography’s historical alignment with 
truth, the evidentiary and the objective documentation of what has been.2 On the other 
hand, simulation has always been at the heart of the medium. Although the simulacral 
nature of photography has received comparatively less attention from scholars, it is 
evident from as early as 1840 in what has been described as the first staged photograph—
Hippolyte Bayard’s Self Portrait as a Drowned Man. The disregard of photography’s 
simulacral capacity (in favour of its truthfulness) has wider relevance to art history. 
Michael Camille has argued that the simulacrum has been repressed in art history 
because “it subverts the cherished dichotomy of model and copy, original and 
reproduction, image and likeness” (1996: 31). The simulacrum is not a reliable copy; 
rather, it destabilises copying by throwing into disarray the distinction between the model 
and copy. The simulacrum overthrows the foundational notion of the model as primary in 
art and challenges the idea of representation. 
Philosophically, the simulacrum possesses the capacity to undermine the structure of 
model and copy that has persisted since Plato. Smith attributes the origin of the philosophical 
re-emergence of the concept to Pierre Klossowski (Smith 1997). The simulacrum recurs in 
French philosophy from the 1960s through writers such as Klossowski, Deleuze and Foucault. 
The concept was also explored by Derrida in Dissemination (1981) with direct reference to 
Plato, before gaining further recognition in Baudrillard’s theorisations of simulation and the 
hyperreal. Camille examines philosophical, literary (including Guy Debord and Philip K. 
Dick) and artistic developments, drawing particular attention to photography’s “challenge to 
‘auratic’ art” (1996: 34).3 The conceptual resonances between aura and simulacrum are 
supplemented by Klossowski’s contribution to the translation of Benjamin’s “Work of Art” 
essay.4 Benjamin’s account of the decline of aura is constructed within a reflection on the 
experience of modernity and the historical development of photography concerned with the 
“presence of the original,” the copy and authenticity (1999 [1936]: 214). 
In “Reinventing the Medium,” Rosalind Krauss reads Benjamin’s essay in relation to 
the convergence of art and photography whereby the latter’s “perfect instance of a multiple-
without-an-original” and “structural status as copy” engendered ontological collapse (1999: 
290). Krauss insists that photography not only enables the reproduction of works of art, it 
undermines the concept of the “original” through which artworks are constituted. In “A Note 
on Photography and the Simulacral” (1984), Krauss considers the photograph’s status as copy 
in relation to the simulacrum, and with reference to her own translation of Deleuze’s “Plato 
and the Simulacrum” (1983). Krauss insists that photography performs a deconstructive 
mechanism that challenges the differences between “the original and the copy, the first idea 
and its slavish imitators” (1984: 59). Photography deconstructs art by enabling the production 
of a false copy that undermines “the whole system of model and copy, original and fake, first- 
and second-degree replication” (1984: 63). Photography’s mediation as duplication 
problematises the ontological existence of the artwork as an “original.” Moreover, Krauss 
reads photography as “the image that is resemblant only by mechanical circumstance and not 
by internal, essential connection to the model” (1984: 63). This insistence on photography’s 
simulacral replication of the model’s external appearance will be seen to have particular 
pertinence to Deleuze’s reading of Plato. 
<HEAD1><TITLE>“Plato and the simulacrum”</TITLE></HEAD1> 
<DISP-QUOTE>Stranger: When we say that he deceives with that semblance we 
spoke of and that his art is a practice of deception, shall we be saying that, as the 
effect of his art, our mind thinks what is false?</DISP-QUOTE> 
<ATTRIB>(Plato, 1935)5</ATTRIB></DISP-QUOTE> 
<DISP-QUOTE>[S]imulacra are precisely demonic images, stripped of 
resemblance. Or rather, in contrast to icônes, they have externalised resemblance 
and live on difference instead. If they produce an external effect of resemblance, 
this takes the form of an illusion. 
<ATTRIB>(Deleuze 2004a: 155)</ATTRIB></DISP-QUOTE> 
Deleuze’s most sustained account of the simulacrum was published as an 
appendix to Logique du sens in 1969.6 Translated as “The Simulacrum and Ancient 
Philosophy,” the appendix comprises two sections: “Plato and the Simulacrum” and 
“Lucretius and the Simulacrum.” Although drawing on a number of Platonic dialogues, 
including the Statesman and the Phaedrus, it is Plato’s Sophist that is most pertinent as it 
is the origin of the Platonic idea of the simulacrum. In Difference and Repetition, where 
Deleuze also discusses the simulacrum, he asserts that “The whole of Platonism … is 
dominated by the idea of drawing a difference between ‘the thing itself’ and the 
simulacra” (2004a: 80). Smith reiterates the point that Plato’s goal was to select or “faire 
le difference (literally, to ‘make the difference’) between true and false images” (2006: 
91). For Deleuze, however, the task is to transform the type of differentiation that occurs 
within the Platonic account of the simulacrum; his reformulation of the concept as 
possessing a positive—internal—difference from the original can be read as an 
overturning of Plato’s philosophy. 
Deleuze begins his “Plato and the Simulacrum” essay by posing the question, “what 
does it mean ‘to reverse Platonism’?” This question is initially attributed to Nietzsche, who 
saw the reversal of Platonism as the task of philosophy. Deleuze, however, also traces the 
desire to abolish the Platonic “world of essences” and “the world of appearances” to Kant and 
Hegel (2004b: 291). Deleuze’s concern here is not restricted to the denunciation of essences 
and appearances. He moves from essence (intelligible, Idea) and appearance (sensible, image) 
to an investigation of the particular question of the distinction between copies and simulacra 
(2004b: 294). In this Deleuzian exegesis, copies are secondary possessors that are well 
founded because they resemble that which they copy (2004b: 294). Conversely, simulacra are 
false pretenders that dissimulate. Deleuze’s analysis comprises a discussion of contrasting 
forms of resemblance (in the distinction between internal and external resemblance). 
Simplistically, the distinction is between good copies and bad copies, or between copies-icons 
and simulacra-phantasms. Whereas the former resembles the Idea of the original, the latter 
produces only a deceitful external resemblance. Deleuze insists that the reversal of Platonism 
must be achieved through a revelation of its motivation: Platonism can only be reversed by 
being tracked down, “the way Plato tracks down the Sophist” (2004b: 291). 
The Sophist is a late Platonic dialogue that follows an attempt to define the sophistic 
charlatan philosopher. The opening sections of the text make clear the intention of the 
dialogue—to “begin by studying the sophist” and to “try to bring his nature to light” (S 218b). 
The goal of the dialogue then is to distinguish and define the sophist. The Sophist begins with 
Theodorus introducing the Stranger from Elea to Socrates. Hearing that the stranger is from 
the school of Parmenides and Zeno, Socrates assumes that he may be an exponent of 
sophistry. Sophists were viewed as false philosophers who sought verbal victory over others, 
yet with little regard for the truth. It is in this sense that sophistry is viewed as an “art of 
controversy” (S 232e) and as “a practice of deception” (Cornford 1935: 190). The Sophist is 
of relevance to the concept of the simulacrum because it is in the course of the dialogue that 
we discover the nature of authentic and inauthentic practices of philosophy and of true and 
false representation. Sophistry, according to Francis Macdonald Cornford, is “the false 
counterfeit of philosophy … and has its being in the world of eidola that is neither real nor 
totally unreal” (1935: 173). In searching for the paradoxical figure that is the “true sophist,” 
Plato examines the relation between reality and appearance and proposes clear distinctions 
between the copy and the simulacrum. 
The Platonic method of division provides the means through which the sophist will be 
defined. As Cornford notes, the dialectic is used to separate things that are “alike” and “the 
Division is a downward process from that genus to the definition of a species” (1935: 183–4). 
Following the Platonic method, “the species [sophist] is to be defined by systematically 
dividing the genus that is taken to include it” (1935: 170). If the sophist is to be found, then he 
must be sought in sophistic practices. Plato’s dialogue begins with the genus arts, which is 
divided into the acquisitive (in the sense of acquiring that which already exists) and the 
productive, and into further subdivisions within these categories. Later divisions explore the 
acquisitive arts through the two subdivisions of “arts by capture” and “by exchange.” The 
sophist is initially placed in the former category of “arts by capture” under “hunting” (S 
231d), but is subsequently examined under the latter category of acquisition “by exchange,” 
where he is deemed a peddler of “wisdom” (charging fees for his “knowledge”). In Division 
VI, the sophist is discerned to use the art of persuasion—seeking to deceive others with false 
knowledge. The Sophist’s seventh and final division explores the genus of the productive arts. 
It is within this genus, via an exploration of real and unreal (images) that the sophist will be 
found. 
Returning to the question of photography, we could surmise that it is an acquisitive 
art, not simply because of its immediate linguistic correlations with hunting (snapshot, for 
example, derives from a hunting term), but by virtue of its action—to “capture” or take 
images. Writing on resemblance, Deleuze views photography as a process “which captures 
relations of light” (2003 [1981]: 80). Photography is also, however, a productive and creative 
art that transforms reality. Though dismissive of photography’s capacity to function as art, 
Deleuze concedes that the “photograph ‘creates’ the person or the landscape” (2003 [1981]: 
64). Deleuze’s assessment of photography is that it functions as the simulacrum rather than 
the true copy: “the most significant thing about the photograph is that it forces upon us the 
‘truth’ of implausible and doctored images” (2003 [1981]: 64). Deleuze also compares 
photographs with the actions of Lucretius’s simulacrum (2003 [1981]: 64). 
The final division of image-making in the Sophist is where we encounter the 
distinction between the copy and the simulacrum. The first category of image-making is “the 
making of likenesses (eikastiké)” the perfect copy that “conforms to the proportions of the 
original” (S 235d). The Stranger in the dialogue insists that the “first kind of image,” which is 
“like the original, may fairly be called a likeness (eikon)” (S 236a). The second kind of image, 
however, produces only an appearance of a likeness. The Stranger indicates that the second 
form of image is something that pretends to resemble the original, that “seems to be a 
likeness, but is not really so” (S 236b). The first type of image is a true resemblance; the 
second type belongs to the art of “semblance (phantasma)” (S 236b). This distinction between 
true and false copies forms the basis of Deleuze’s analysis of the simulacrum. 
Whereas Plato’s dialogue on image-making distinguishes between “likenesses” and 
“semblances,” Deleuze’s distinction is between “two sorts of images”—copies and simulacra 
(2004b: 294). Deleuze’s “copy” corresponds to what is described by the Stranger in the 
Sophist as “likenesses” or eikastiké. Copies are “secondary possessors” that are “well-founded 
pretenders,” as they are “guaranteed by resemblance” (2004b: 294). Deleuze’s simulacrum 
corresponds to the second form of Plato’s division of image-making—the “semblance” or 
phantasma. Simulacra, according to Deleuze, are “false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity” 
(2004b: 294). The term “simulacra” here is understood as the Latin translation of the Greek 
phantasma. Perhaps in acknowledgement of Plato’s Greek (eikon and phantasma), Deleuze 
also construes the “copies” and “simulacra” as “copies-icons” and “simulacra-phantasms.” 
Deleuze insists that the resemblance of the copies-icons to their original confers upon them 
the status of “good images” (2004b: 294). These well-founded claimants are “endowed with 
resemblance” in contrast to the dissimilarity of the unfounded pretenders (2004b: 294). 
The origin of Plato’s concern to distinguish the validity of rival claimants arises within 
the context of Plato’s Greek polis. Plato’s sophist thrives within an agonistic society as a self-
appointed philosopher. In contrast to the state-appointed wise man deemed to be in possession 
of wisdom, the philosopher in the cities of Greece was categorised as one who seeks wisdom 
“but does not possess it” (Smith 2006: 92–3). This is the context wherein the problem of 
resemblance and authenticity arises. Deleuze notes that the problem of rival claimants also 
occurs in Plato’s the Statesman and the Phaedrus. The purpose of Plato’s dialectic, according 
to Deleuze, is not to discern a species but to “select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to 
distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic” (2004b: 292). 
Deleuze is critical of the Platonic system of selection, which he views in terms of descending 
degrees of hierarchical ranks of participants down to “the one who is himself a mirage and 
simulacrum” (2004b: 293). 
Plato’s account of difference operates within a transcendent hierarchy premised on 
failure to resemble the Idea. The Idea is created in response to the problem of judgement. The 
Idea, then, becomes a “criterion” for judging between the authentic and counterfeit claimants: 
“Only the Idea,” writes Smith, is “‘the thing itself’, only the Idea is ‘self-identical’” (2006: 
96). As Smith notes, “the claimant will be well-founded only to the degree that it resembles or 
imitates the foundation” (2006: 96). The question of lineage and resemblance to the Idea (or 
foundation) was central to Plato’s task to establish the difference between the just claimant 
(the good copy) and the pretender (the simulacrum). The claim of pretension from the 
unfounded claimant corresponds to the simulacrum’s claim to the Idea. As a philosopher of 
immanence, Deleuze is opposed to a Platonic judgement that places the transcendent Idea at 
the top of a hierarchy of resemblance. Deleuze unpacks the structure of copy and simulacrum 
and frees the latter from its position at the bottom of a Platonic chain of similitude. Rather 
than being defined in relation to lack, Deleuze’s simulacrum possesses difference as a positive 
attribute. 
Possessing internal distinction from the model, Deleuze’s simulacrum can be seen as 
an affirmation of difference and as a reversal of Plato’s transcendent structure. Deleuze’s 
account overthrows the hierarchy of similitude within which difference and the simulacrum 
are established. The Deleuzian simulacrum moves in the direction of difference rather than 
sameness—a difference that is not secondary to, or preceded by, a superior identity but is a 
difference in itself. In Deleuze’s definition, the simulacrum, far from resembling the Idea, is 
always becoming other. The difference between the simulacrum and the copy is no longer a 
question of degree, but is rather a “difference in nature” (2004b: 295). Deleuze’s simulacrum 
may possess a resemblance to the original but this is merely external. There is internal 
difference; the simulacrum does not pass through the Idea. The (good) copy, on the other 
hand, possesses a form of internal resemblance that bears a relation to the Idea of the thing 
that it copies—the “internal essence” (Deleuze 2004b: 294). The Deleuzian simulacrum 
escapes the repressive Platonic depths and rises to the surface, unencumbered by the 
hierarchical distinction between essence and appearance, model and copy. 
How might photography function in relation to Plato’s division of image-making? The 
photograph can be seen as the copy of a thing that is itself a copy of the original Idea (or 
form). This relation recalls the discussion of representation in Plato’s Republic, where “art” is 
conceived as distantly removed from the truth. Plato’s division of the productive arts 
distinguishes a trio of “makers”: God as the producer of the Form/Idea, the craftsman who 
reproduces it, and the artist who produces an “appearance” of the craftsman’s copy. The artist 
is placed at the bottom of the trio as someone who produces a representation far removed 
from reality. The artist copies the carpenter’s rendering without understanding the original 
“Idea.” Plato suggests that, in the example of the bed, the painter is only capable of rendering 
an appearance of a copy, and from a particular viewpoint. Two-dimensional media possess 
particular challenges in their restricted capacity to represent reality. Reflecting on the 
Republic, Patton asserts that the painter can only “represent the bed as seen from a certain 
angle” (1994: 148). This limitation is equally true for photography. In the Republic, all art is 
categorised as mimetic appearance-making. 
In the Sophist, however, a distinction emerges between “two forms of imitation”: the 
true likeness “conforms to the proportions of the original in all three dimensions” (S 235d), 
whereas the semblance (the simulacrum, or bad copy) enacts a deviation from the original it 
purports to resemble. The simulacrum is analogous to a large artwork where the sculptor or 
painter distorts the “true proportions” in accordance with the perspective of the viewer (S 
235d–236). In the case of a classical sculpture, this “correction” of the true proportion is made 
to ensure that the lower parts of the sculpture—that are closer to the viewer—do not look out 
of proportion with the (more distant) upper parts when viewed from below. The dialogue 
concludes that such distorted works are not likenesses but semblances, or, in Deleuze’s 
terminology—simulacra. Although the photograph comprises a two-dimensional imitation, it 
is also potentially a “good copy” in its capacity to “reproduce the true proportions” of the 
original (S 235e). 
<HEAD1><TITLE>The simulacrum in photography: Sarah Pickering’s Public 
Order</TITLE></HEAD1> 
Questions of similitude and authenticity have been a recurring feature in the work of 
Sarah Pickering, a British artist who predominantly works with photography. Pickering 
became increasingly interested in the work of Jeff Wall, Thomas Demand and Cindy 
Sherman as a graduate student at the Royal College of Art in the early 2000s. She was 
acutely conscious of how “fine art photographers” were “making something in front of 
the camera” (Pickering 2015). Pickering was also influenced by Baudrillard’s account of 
simulation where reality is replaced by “signs of the real.”7 Contemporary photography 
that engages the Deleuzian simulacrum (where there is an intentional internal difference 
from the Idea of the original) highlights the conceptual role of the artist in making 
“copies” of reality in a manner that exceeds the mimetic and functional aspects of the 
medium.8 
In Public Order, Fire Scene and Incident, Pickering can be seen to challenge the 
nature of photography’s existence as a documentary and indexical medium.9 But her work 
still functions as a document of staged scenes and is still indexical in this respect. The 
unreality and artifice entailed in these series may recall constructed photography consisting of 
events or tableaux staged for the camera (as in the work of Wall and Demand). However, 
Pickering’s subjects are not created in order to be photographed. Moreover, the work exists at 
the level of the documentary in combination with “real” spaces. It is the virtual nature of 
these—paradoxically real—environments that is the source of the fictive in Pickering’s work. 
The streets and interiors in Public Order, Fire Scene and Incident have been constructed as 
simulated spaces for training UK police, military forces and emergency services. These sites 
are more than props or backdrops though: they are the stages on which simulation training 
occurs in a convincingly real way. Pickering witnessed training exercises where new recruits 
were subjected to verbal abuse and even had petrol bombs thrown at them.10 A different kind 
of reality exists in Fire Scene, where the interiors are also a site of investigation enabling 
forensic analysis training of actual burnt buildings. The knowledge that these spaces are in 
fact simulated environments problematises the works’ apparent documentary nature. Public 
Order, Fire Scene and Incident reproduce the surface appearance of “reality” in a manner that 
resembles the original. However, the work does not reproduce the Idea (or “internal essence”) 
of its model. In what follows, the focus will largely be on Pickering’s Public Order series and 
its relation to the Deleuzian simulacrum. 
Public Order largely comprises exterior shots of a place called Denton. This much is 
evident from the iconic London Transport sign at the entrance to the station (see Figure 6.1). 
But all is not as it seems. Denton is not a borough in London but a site used for the purposes 
of riot training. Pickering’s “Denton” consists of several UK police force training sites. This 
fictional Denton stretches from Gravesend to Hounslow, from Greater Manchester to the 
Midlands, and was photographed over a period of three years, from 2002 to 2005. Denton 
sounds like a real place, and there are several villages and towns called Denton in England 
and in the United States. Denton is also the fictional setting for the Rocky Horror Picture 
Show and the village in the British TV series Touch of Frost, based on the Frost novels by R. 
D. Wingfield. Similarly, this photographed Denton is a fictional construction akin to a film 
set. 
<FIG><LBL>Figure 6.1</LBL> <CAPTION>Sarah Pickering, Denton Underground 
Station (2003), from Public Order series. Courtesy the artist</CAPTION></FIG> 
Denton Underground Station appears to depict an empty suburban street. The photograph is 
dominated by the station entrance in the foreground and an adjacent street receding into the 
background. Ubiquitous street furniture such as lampposts and CCTV cameras, as well as the 
lines painted on the tarmacked road, compound the impression of an everyday scene. The 
neutral skyline, combined with the dominant grey of the concrete construction, recalls the 
topographical photography of the Bechers. Details such as the painted doors and window 
surrounds (in addition to the bright colours of the London Transport roundel) provide 
convincing props, but a closer look at the street on the left reveals ‘houses’ that consist only 
of brick facades. The initial impression of an everyday street scene belies the truth of this 
simulated construction. 
Lola Court comprises the rear view of a modern housing development. The scene 
consists of concrete-block houses and a similarly coloured grey fence. The compositional 
space evokes claustrophobia and suggests a sinister presence. The unease inherent in the 
picture is heightened by scorched areas that trace a violent or traumatic event.11Traversing 
through the open gate, it is possible to enter the shadowy interior of the doorway. Yet these 
apparently real houses have no homely interior and evoke only the uncanny. They are empty 
shells, entirely devoid of furniture, curtains or any trace of residents. Lola Court recalls the 
simulacral home constructed inside Tate Britain by the artist Michael Landy (Semi-detached, 
2004), where the familiar-looking exterior masked the domestic void inside. The buildings in 
Lola Court echo Deleuze’s simulacrum—externally resembling (a real house) but possessing 
internal difference from the Idea. By depicting the external semblance rather than the interior 
reality, Lola Court produces a paradoxically “truthful” repetition of the false original. This 
“good copy” of a simulacrum problematises the Platonic distinctions between original, copy 
and simulacrum. 
Public Order pictures everything we would expect to see in a suburban area. Front 
Garden, School Road includes a landscaped area of shrubs and trees adjacent to a bus shelter; 
Farrance Street shows the back of an Indian restaurant and takeaway. Whereas the concrete-
block buildings are in Gravesend, the houses fronted by London bricks (some of which are 
brightly painted) and the majority of the shops are located in Hounslow. Occasionally there 
are signs of the real purpose: charred buildings, discarded shopping trolleys, bricks and tyres 
evidence the aftermath of a staged riot. High Street contains an extant barricade; River Way 
includes two smashed-up cars. Victoria Road has extensively scorched buildings, including 
the burned face of a male figure on an advertising poster accompanied by the text “Allure.” 
This self-referential element—the photograph within the photograph, or mis-en-abyme—
recalls Walker Evans’s Torn Movie Poster (1931) and highlights further the degree of 
construction within the image. The solitary model looks directly out at the viewer while 
conveying the glamorous appeal of Chanel’s eau de toilette pour homme. The ‘allure’ has 
long faded, however, both in this poster and in its neglected environment. The advert is not 
only ironic, but knowing; it operates as a simulacrum within the simulacral environment 
(where it was used to authenticate a simulated space). When re-photographed, the advert 
prompts reflection on the documentary and indexical aspects of photography. The poster is 
doubly indexical in its photographic tracing of the figure and in its subsequent physical 
recording of fire damage sustained during simulation training. Framed within Victoria Road, 
the poster becomes a re-presentation that serves to undermine its original representational 
function. 
<FIG><LBL>Figure 6.2</LBL> <CAPTION>Sarah Pickering, Job Centre, Transport 
Lane (2004), from Public Order series. Courtesy the artist</CAPTION></FIG> 
Job Centre, Transport Lane (see Figure 6.2) depicts the area at the back of a train station. The 
dominant greys in the photograph are punctuated by the amber hue of the stationary train and 
the bright yellow of the employment service logo and delivery truck. The train appears to be 
destined for Glasgow Central. Marooned in a make-believe town, this scene recalls the surreal 
juxtaposition of Breton’s locomotive abandoned for many years in a forest (L’Amour Fou). 
This example of Breton’s “convulsive beauty” is particularly pertinent to photography. Krauss 
sees Breton’s image of a stationary train—of “something that should be in motion but has 
been stopped”—as “intrinsically photographic” (1986: 112). Detached from “the continuum 
of its natural existence,” the train is turned “into a sign of a reality it no longer possesses” 
(1986: 112). For Krauss, “the still photograph of this stilled train” is a “representation of an 
object already constituted as a representation” (1986: 112). Similarly, the found object of the 
stationary train in Public Order is an intrinsic part of an environment that is already 
representational. Denton is an image of an image, and Public Order is a copy of an image 
without an original. The fake town is already a simulacrum that produces a semblance of the 
outward appearance of a—supposedly real—town without origin. Public Order is not simply 
a copy of a copy at a “third remove” from reality: it duplicates a “model” that has no 
foundation. In re-presenting the town photographically, Public Order diverges from Denton’s 
real purpose or Idea. 
Public Order also provokes reflection on the reality behind the simulacral nature of 
Denton. Alongside the seemingly innocuous artificial constructions, reside signs of the real. 
The inclusion of the job centre is of particular significance. Pickering observes that class 
stereotypes proliferate throughout the training grounds of the police, military and emergency 
services (2015). Public Order training spaces are devised as stereotypical, run-down working- 
class towns. These simulated environments are purposefully designed as similar to places 
where public order is deemed necessary. It would seem that such dystopic spaces are where 
disorder occurs. The unloved housing developments, unprepossessing fast-food outlets 
(including a burger joint and a Tandoori restaurant) and the dated Flicks nightclub—in 
addition to the employment agency—all reveal something of the bias inherent in their 
construction. One of the training sites has its own football pitch; another contains the exterior 
facade of a dreary pub. The decisions behind the design of these carefully crafted environs 
suggest an institutional gaze that encompasses socio-economic criminal profiling. The 
designers’ impetus to create riot-training spaces in areas of suburban neglect and urban 
decline—as well as high unemployment—conveys a considerable degree of class prejudice. 
The notion that such a town would require a Foucauldian “disciplinary method” is further 
highlighted by the CCTV cameras that are also omnipresent in many British cities. However, 
in this fabricated scenario, the CCTV cameras are actually real—they exist in conjunction 
with a panopticon viewing tower enabling those in authority to oversee the riot training. The 
virtual, insidious institutional gaze behind the design of the space is accompanied by the 
actual gaze of senior police officers in a central control room. 
There are disturbingly real elements then behind these constructed sets. The interior 
scenes of the Greater Manchester Police unit photographs—despite lacking some of the 
degree of detail of the other sites—are real in other ways. Guards/Violent Man depicts the 
training area for dealing with a violent person. Beneath the painted “violent man” sign is the 
storage unit for the props for the “re-enactment” (including shelves of black riot-proof 
helmets with protective visors). Pickering is intent on showing us behind the veil of these 
simulacral spaces. She ensures that the artifice is revealed—sometimes by selecting a scene or 
camera angle that reveals the theatrical components. By reflexively pointing to the fake 
construction, such photographs engage with the simulacrum only in order to destroy its 
illusionary power. Semi-detached also reveals its constructed reality (see Plate 6). Two 
concrete-block houses comprise a single building; positioned in the centre of the photograph, 
they are in perfect alignment with a lamppost that bifurcates them. Whereas the painted green 
door on the left maintains the illusion offered by the frontal view, the open doorway on the 
right reveals the real green landscape behind it. This open door (which Pickering encountered 
in situ) is a void in the image—a gap in the field of representation that reveals the real: the ‘no 
man’s land’ that lies beyond the secure perimeter fence of this military zone. The open door in 
Semi-detached is a rupture in the constructed surface of the image, a wound in the image as 
picture. The visibility of the real landscape (of the Thames estuary) behind the facade reveals 
the construction of the house as an image. Semi-detached then functions by means of external 
resemblance to the original, but it clearly diverges by picturing the truth behind the 
semblance. 
Dickens, High Street and Flicks Nightclub depict the same side of the main street from 
different viewing positions. At first glance, both photographs portray an everyday street scene 
featuring commercial premises in a small town, although the upturned shopping trolleys and 
discarded tyres in Dickens, High Street and the charred door in Flicks Nightclub hint at 
something beyond the ordinary (see Plate 7). Behind Flicks Nightclub, however, reveals the 
full extent of the facade. Whereas the former images still maintain the illusion of the main 
street, Behind Flicks Nightclub is the denouement of the series (see cover image). The rear of 
the street is devoid of buildings and comprises an open space with gravelled ground. The 
shallow brick frontage is held up by metal supports and girders; the illumination of the fake 
shop windows is explained by the electric cables that run from the encased windows. This 
third photograph places the viewer backstage, behind the painted facade. Behind Flicks 
Nightclub unmasks the mechanism of trompe l’oeil: it pulls back the curtain of the illusion 
and reveals the surface nature of the simulacrum. 
Guards/Violent Man and Behind Flicks Nightclub demonstrate a different relation to 
similitude from those photographs that appear to maintain the illusion; they eschew external 
resemblance (to the simulacral model) and move further in the direction of difference. Denton 
Underground Station, Lola Court, Job Centre, Transport Lane and Flicks Nightclub are 
initially indiscernible from images of a real town. Others, such as Victoria Road (with the 
traces of rioting), suggest the truth behind the space’s real purpose. Guards/Violent Man, 
Semi-detached and Behind Flicks Nightclub, however, clearly reveal the degree of semblance 
in the fictional Denton. The unmasking of the original Denton as a mere representation can be 
seen as a moment of disjuncture with the simulacrum as such. Deleuze describes simulation as 
operating through masking or a “process of disguising, where, behind each mask, there is yet 
another” (2004b: 300). The photographs in Public Order that most clearly reveal behind the 
simulacral facade (notably Guards/Violent Man and Behind Flicks Nightclub) are not a 
reversal of the simulacrum, however—they are not “good copies” of Denton. Moreover, what 
is revealed beneath the mask is neither “a face” nor “an originary model behind the copy” 
(Smith 2006: 104). 
In Public Order, the revelation of the facile nature of the original simulacrum also 
negates the illusion of representational depth; it is as if the “phantasms of the surface have 
replaced the hallucination of depth” (Deleuze 2004b: 30). The photographs that reveal the 
phantasmatic semblance constitute a further liberation from resemblance (of Denton as 
model). Indeed, the permutations can be seen as part of the dynamic genesis of simulation 
where “simulacra ascend and become phantasms” (Deleuze 2004b: 354). The differential 
relation to similitude within the series (with some photographs appearing to maintain the 
illusion, and others clearly revealing the semblance) produces a divergence that comprises the 
rejection of the Idea of the illusion. Public Order comprises an internal disparity within its 
serial form that echoes Deleuze’s account of modern art: “Difference must be shown 
differing. We know that modern art tends to realise these conditions … The work of art leaves 
the domain of representation” (2004a: 68). For Deleuze, “the domain of representation filled 
by copies-icons” was founded by Plato (2004b: 296). Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism 
encompasses the affirmation of simulacra (via repetition with internal difference). The 
simulacrum’s agility is contrasted with the stasis of representation, which: “mediates 
everything, but mobilises and moves nothing” and fails to capture difference (2004a: 67). 
Deleuze aligns the simulacrum with modernity, and particularly with pop art in its serial 
manifestation of a repetition with difference: 
<DISP-QUOTE>pop art pushed the copy, the copy of the copy, 
etc., to that extreme point at which it reverses and becomes a 
simulacrum (such as Warhol’s remarkable ‘serial’ series, in which all 
the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated). 
<ATTRIB>(2004a: 366)</ATTRIB></DISP-QUOTE> 
There is a conceptual relation between Pickering’s Behind Flicks Nightclub 
(2004) and Jeff Wall’s Destroyed Room (1978, which is itself a direct reference to 
Delacroix’s Death of Sardanapalus, 1827). Destroyed Room appears to show us the 
aftermath of a crime or violent incident. Yet it also reveals its staging by depicting the 
wooden struts supporting the fake constructed walls of the set. Like Destroyed Room, 
much of Pickering’s Public Order does not bracket off the edges of its constructed set; 
the staging of the image is visible within the photograph. One could situate Destroyed 
Room and Public Order within a specific subset of contemporary photography that not 
only presents simulated environments for the camera, but reveals the artifice behind its 
fabricated subject. However, there are distinct differences in the photographer’s role with 
regard to the creation of these constructions. Whereas Wall’s Destroyed Room is staged 
for the camera, Pickering’s Denton has a real purpose that precedes its being 
photographed. 
The inclusion of Public Order in the exhibition Staging Disorder12 revealed its 
similarities to, and differences from, constructed and staged imagery. In this context, Public 
Order had most resonance with Claudio Hils’s series Red Land, Blue Land and Broomberg 
and Chanarin’s Chicago—which also comprise photographs of military training sites. David 
Campany’s inclusion of Public Order in a number of “documentary projects” where “artifice 
is their subject matter” prompts reflection on their individual differences.13 Campany 
highlights their aesthetic similarities—their “common visual style” that resonates with “the 
register of hyper-real simulation” with regard to virtual reality and the video game (2006: 10–
11). However, the conceptual and political critique behind this work is elided when the 
emphasis is placed on the aesthetic. Moreover, Campany’s assertion that the work is 
indistinguishable from “functional documents” produced by “military training facilities” 
overlooks the work’s artistic and conceptual qualities (2006: 11). There is an intentional 
difference between these sites—or their functional documentation—and artistic reproductions. 
Although externally resembling the spaces that they reproduce, such work has an internal 
conceptual difference from the Idea of the original (and from its “functional documents”). 
Pickering’s work is not concerned with artifice so much as unmasking what lies 
behind it. In an interview with Anthony Luvera, she states that her “ambition is for the work 
to hopefully go beyond questions of ‘is it real or is it not?’ I see it as being much more about 
the complicated social systems that are represented in the constructed scenarios” (Pickering 
and Luvera 2009: n.p.). Pickering’s concern is with the politics of representation behind these 
sites, and with these spaces as representation (of the public, and perhaps most particularly of 
lower socio-economic groups).14 Public Order produces an appearance that resembles the 
original (Denton), yet possesses an intentional difference. Moreover, its particular simulacral 
operation—much like that of Deleuze’s simulacrum—enacts a positive difference that serves 
to question the hierarchy entailed in representation. Pickering’s intention is not to revel in 
artifice but to reveal the insidious reality of the constructions and the socio-economic, 
political and moral judgements behind their design. 
Public Order deconstructs socio-economic stereotypes in a similar way to Sherman’s 
deconstruction of Hollywood’s “stock personae” (Krauss 1984: 59). There are differences 
between Pickering and Sherman in their distinctive approaches to staging: whereas Sherman 
creates and performs the role of the stereotype—embodying the simulacrum—Pickering 
selects and documents a pre-existing simulacrum in a way that undermines its staging. Krauss 
highlights that, because Sherman is “both subject and object,” then “the play of stereotype in 
her work is a revelation of the artist herself as stereotypical” (1984: 59). Pickering’s 
deconstruction of the stereotype consists of a reproduction by different means—Public Order 
repeats the “original” simulacrum in order to reveal the stereotype. Yet both artists “reproduce 
what is already a reproduction” (1984: 59). Moreover, they both engage with the simulacrum 
in order to produce a deconstructive mechanism via a process of repeating with difference. 
Pickering produces a deconstruction of representation by highlighting the inherent stereotype 
and revealing the representation as representation (by going behind the representation to 
photograph its superficial reality). The correlation is further highlighted by Krauss’s reading 
of Sherman: “the subject of her images is this flattened, cardboard imitation … her execution 
is no less preordained and controlled by the culturally already-given” (1984: 59). Like 
Sherman’s, Pickering’s use of photography constitutes a form of critique. 
Pickering’s work often engages reflexively with representation by depicting something 
that is already an image. In this regard, there is a confluence between her work and the genre 
of rephotography. The “Pictures” group—including Sherrie Levine and Richard Prince—were 
the most cited exponents of rephotography (a genre that was often aligned with the 
Baudrillardian simulacrum).15 In his essay “Anti-Platonism and Art,” Paul Patton reads the 
work of Levine (and others) as exemplars of postmodernist art, “concerned with the 
reproduction of appearances” (1994: 142). Patton asserts that these appearances are not 
simply “second-order” reproductions (of pre-existing images), but they entail a transformation 
through the artist’s conceptual production (1994: 142). Whereas (modern) realist art aimed to 
eliminate the difference between the original and the copy, postmodernism inverts this goal 
by establishing difference through similarity (Patton 1994: 142–3). Pickering’s work consists 
of a Deleuzian simulacral repetition (a semblance rather than a likeness) that possesses 
internal difference from the original. This is particularly evident in her Art and Antiquities 
series, which includes complex photographic “documentations” of the fakes produced by the 
notorious art forger Shaun Greenhalgh. Also comprising recreated scenes with genuine 
forgeries (as well as fake artefacts constructed for a television programme about Greenhalgh), 
this series manifests the irony behind Plato’s Sophist—of searching for the true pretender. 
Greenhalgh’s fake artworks also achieve ‘authenticity’ when they are photographed by an 
artist using a historic photographic technique such as the salt print. Pickering observes that, 
whereas appropriation art of the 1980s such as that by Levine drew on the work of (real) 
photographers such as Evans, her Art and Antiquities replicate something that is fake (2015). 
In Art and Antiquities and in Public Order, photography is no longer aligned with 
representation but with repetition. Pickering’s work demonstrates difference from, rather than 
identity with, that which it purports to copy. Writing on Prince, Michael Newman insists that 
rephotography does not produce a perfect copy: it is a resemblance that bears difference 
(2006: 54–5). For Newman, repetition is the means through which the simulacrum is 
manifested; he insists that this is a repetition with difference: 
<DISP-QUOTE>It is not possible to ‘penetrate’ the simulacrum, as if to pierce 
through a veil, because there is nothing behind or beyond. The only way of getting 
some purchase on it as simulacrum, the only way to make the ‘as’ manifest, is to 
repeat it. Thus repetition can be understood as a way of creating a horizontal 
difference across the depthless surface of simulation. 
<ATTRIB>(2006: 54–5)</ATTRIB></DISP-QUOTE> 
In Public Order, Pickering repeats Denton as simulacrum and pictures the veil itself in 
all its depthless surface. Public Order consists of photographs that repeat a model 
without origin, but they do not faithfully copy the Idea of Denton: the aesthetic 
resemblance belies the intentional artistic differences. Denton is already a simulacrum, 
but Public Order produces a simulacral copy—a simulacrum of a simulacrum—that 
challenges the original (mis)representation. 
Representation and repetition are intrinsic to photography. Photography as a medium 
consists in copying; it repeats and often duplicates its referent as model. Photography’s 
mediation—as re-production and re-presentation—can be seen to embody the Platonic “good 
copy” that repeats the identity of its model. Deleuze describes photography as an analogical 
medium that “proceeds by resemblance” (Deleuze 2003 [1981]: 80). For Krauss, though, 
photography’s resemblance is such that it “raises the specter of nondifferentiation” and thus 
undermines the distinction that Plato seeks to make between the original and the copy (1984: 
59). Krauss, then, reads a certain Deleuzianism into photography. In Krauss’s analysis, 
photography’s mimetic capacity enables its deconstructive mechanism. Public Order 
functions in such a manner—deconstructing the stereotypes behind the fake town, but also 
deconstructing the medium itself. The self-referential elements such as the photograph within 
the photograph (in Victoria Road) or the picturing of the props area in Guards/Violent Man or 
the back-stage area in Behind Flicks Nightclub are additional reflexive tools for this 
deconstruction. Reflexivity rejects conventional mimesis and disrupts our reading of 
photographs as transparent windows on the world. What is brought to the fore in Public Order 
is the conceptual difference between photography and its model. 
Public Order functions like the Deleuzian simulacrum in its production of difference 
through repetition. Public Order may produce external resemblance, but there is an essential 
difference from the “original.” Denton is a model town (though it has no original); Public 
Order produces an appearance of something that is already an image, but it is a repetition with 
difference. Public Order’s divergence from the “internal essence” of Denton—the refusal to 
be a “good” copy of the deceitful original—echoes Deleuze’s simulacrum and its undoing of 
the Platonic hierarchy of representation. In refusing conventional photographic 
representation, these works provoke reflection on photography’s potential as a simulacral 
repetition—one that possesses a positive difference from that which it appears to copy. 
Deleuze’s simulacrum feigns resemblance through (external) “appearance-making” that 
disguises its internal dissimilitude (to the Platonic Idea). Pickering’s work engages the 
Deleuzian simulacrum via its phantasmatic appearance-making in conjunction with 
intentional (internal) dissimilitude. 
In its move from representation to repetition, Public Order embodies Deleuze’s 
opposition to Platonic iconology. The affirmation of the simulacrum occurs through similitude 
and dissimilitude. In Public Order, we see photography as a “false copy” encompassing 
internal non-resemblance. That the simulacrum uses resemblance in order to produce 
difference undermines representation as such. Public Order, then, also produces a 
deconstruction of the documentary mechanism of photography as a medium of re-production. 
Rather than proceeding by resemblance, Public Order proceeds (by divergence) through 
semblance and dissemblance. The complex interplay of semblance and dissemblance in 
Public Order challenges photography’s historic alignment with truth, although, in its 
divergence from the original, Public Order is a simulacral repetition that paradoxically 
engenders truth. Simulation reveals photography’s truth.</BODY> 
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1 See Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. P. Patton and J. Protevi (2003), for an interesting comparative study of those 
thinkers. 
2 Roland Barthes characterises the photograph as not merely “a ‘copy’ of reality” but “an emanation of past reality” 
(Barthes 2000 [1980]: 88–9). We cannot deny that “the thing has been there”—that-has-been (Barthes 2000 [1980]: 
76). 
3 Camille references Benjamin’s (1999 [1936]) “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which 
highlights the decline of aura in the era of technological reproducibility (Benjamin’s “Small History of Photography” 
essay is also pertinent). 
4 See Lomas on this point of how Klossowski helped to translate Benjamin’s “Work of Art” essay (2011: 44). 
5 References to Sophist will follow customary Platonic methods of citation and be preceded by the abbreviation S. 
6 Deleuze originally published this essay with a title that specifically referred to the reversal of Platonism in the journal 
Revue de Metaphysics in 1967—see the preface to The Logic of Sense where Deleuze notes that the appendices were 
revised from previous publications (2004b: x). 
7 Baudrillard insists that, in the era of the hyperreal, we encounter a generation of signs that are no longer referential—
“models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 1994 [1981]: 1–2). 
8 This is something that analytical philosophy fails to grasp: in its alignment of photography with automatism, the 
agency and creativity of the photographer are denied. 
9 See Pickering’s book Explosions, Fires and Public Order (2010a). Images are also available on the artist’s website: 
<URI>www.sarahpickering.co.uk/</URI> 
10 Pickering has stated that training officers acting as rioters—and armed with baseball bats—would hit the trainees’ 
shields and that one recruit retaliated by kicking (email from Pickering, 3 March 2016). 
11 Pickering has spoken about the latent threat of violence in these images in an interview with Susan Bright (Pickering 
2010b). She initially photographed the violent training exercises but did not want to produce reportage (Pickering 
2015). Her subsequent decision to photograph deserted spaces surprised the participants, who assumed that the riot 
exercises would have made for more interesting action shots. 
12 Curated by Christopher Stewart and Esther Teichmann—at London College of Communication in 2015. The 
exhibition catalogue Staging Disorder (2015), edited by Stewart and Teichmann, includes artworks and commissioned 
essays. 
13 In Campany’s (2006) essay “Straight Pictures of a Crooked World,” he includes Pickering’s Public Order series in a 
discussion of “documentary” work alongside: Broomberg and Chanarin’s Chicago, An-My Lê’s Small Wars, Larry 
Sultan’s The Valley, and Steffi Klenz’s Nonsuch. 
14 Pickering states that, “All of the burning environments in Fire Scene are particular types of places, representative of 
a particular group of people—usually low income. There’s always a suggestion of neglect or deviation” (2009). 
15 Douglas Crimp’s curation of the Pictures exhibition (1977) and his subsequent essay heralded a generation of artists 
concerned with the nature of the photographic image. Levine’s After Walker Evans (exhibited at New York’s Metro 
Pictures Gallery in 1981) is a paradigmatic example of rephotography. 
